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PROCEDURE CATCHES UP -AND

MAKES TROUBLE
DAVID D. SIEGEL*

Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.1 is a hard one no matter
which side one takes. Under the majority opinion, the distasteful scene
is of a plaintiff whose claim is barred by time before he could possibly
have sued on it. Until plaintiff was injured, he had absolutely no claim
whatever, whether its underlying theory was negligence, warranty, or
strict liability. Yet, when he at last sustained an injury, the law told
him that his claim was not only barred but had in fact, at that moment,
been barred for some time. The law can make what explanations it will,
but to the intelligent layman, and most particularly to the injured
plaintiff, the explanations will not enhance his picture of the law. If
the law gave him, and the majority says it did give him, a substantive

claim in warranty against the glass company, the plaintiff will have to
deem himself the most cheated of donees when, at the first moment
the law allows him to apply, it tells him that his application is too late.
With such an introduction the reader would have to assume that
the minority view is necessarily correct. But we are in a realm of law
in which satisfactory justice to all sides attends neither view. Whichever
way a judge casts his vote there will be some element of injustice to
someone. The cause of this is not an uncommon situation in the law.
It is an almost inevitable result when the substantive law, in our
common-law system, has been stretched by the judges to meet new
situations: the previously unconsidered procedural ramifications finally
catch up, and they pose some interesting challenges.
With the Mendel case, procedure finally intercedes, demanding to
know where, within the recent and rapid evolution of the doctrines of
warranty and strict liability, it stands. One could have guessed that the
procedural problem that would voice its demand most strongly would
be the statute of limitations. Nothing in the law of procedure has more
sudden or substantive impact.
The minority in Mendel would call the plaintiff's claim "strict
liability" and niche it in the "tort" category, thereby invoking the tort
rule that the claim arises (and its attendant period begins to run) from
the time of injury. But while the majority adheres to the view that the
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claim is in warranty and therefore is "contract" for procedural purposes
as well, the minority deems it time to acknowledge that this "contractual" warranty is nothing but a tort suit devised to ease the path of an
injured plaintiff and that the Court should not, by ignoring that reality,
adhere to procedural notions related to "contract" and thereby undo
what the personal-injury-predicated-on-warranty idea was really designed to accomplish in the first place.
Most often cited as the discomforting feature of the minority view
is the prospect of the perpetual liability of a manufacturer. M manufactures an item and sells it to and installs it for B. The glass in the Mendel
case is an ideal example. Years later the glass injures P. If P can prove
negligence against M, in the manufacture or installation, he will make
that the basis of his suit and he will get the benefit of the "tort" rule
that the claim accrues at injury. Then, notwithstanding that a decade
may have passed since M's sale or installation, P would have three years
from the injury in which to sue. But where P cannot prove negligence
- and the farther in time from the sale the more remote his prospect
of sustaining such proof - he must rely upon the other available theories. Mendel seems to establish that whether he labels his alternative
"warranty" or "strict liability in tort," it is still warranty; it is still
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC); and section 2-7252
starts his claim from the sale. (Technically, it is from the "tender of
delivery" under the UCC, which will likely be the source of governing
law in future cases. Mendel itself involved the transitional stage of the
UCC.) The majority cites section 2-318,3 which confers warranty rights
on designated persons, to show that the legislature has spoken here and
the courts are not free to vary the theory of liability (such as by adopting
a "strict liability in tort" theory instead). The minority answers that at
worst the UCC provision merely sets forth one theory of recovery
(warranty) and that it need not be deemed exclusive; that the strict
liability criterion can be superimposed upon it to offer alternative
ground of recovery; and that when this "tort" alternative is used it may
be accompanied by such advantages as the law of procedure, including
that of the statute of limitations, may confer upon it.
The majority contends that to allow this alternative with its procedural advantages would encourage "many unfounded suits ...

against

manufacturers ad infinitum. ' 4 The basis of this conclusion is that since
the plaintiff would not have to prove negligence he would have an easy
§ 2-725.
s Id. § 2-318.
4 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
2 UNIFORf COMMERCIAL CODE

1970]

MENDEL

burden of proof against the manufacturer or seller. The minority answer to this is that it assumes that the "strict liability" burden of proof
is an easy one. It disagrees and calls it "heavy rather than light" because
plaintiff would still have to prove (1) the defect in the merchandise and
(2) that it was the "proximate cause of the injuries." 5
The posture of each view therefore purports to be indulgent of the
seller who is sued many years after the sale. But while the majority
would protect the seller through a statute of limitations held to run
from the time of sale rather than the later time of injury, the minority
would keep the case open under the statute of limitations and rely
instead upon what it deems plaintiff's "heavy" burden of proof to
protect the defendant-seller. Here we can perhaps fault the minority
position with a simple practical truth. Unless the plaintiff so poorly
"discharges" this burden of proof as to have his theory dismissed by the
court, should we not realistically concede that if the plaintiff gets to the
jury his chances of recovery are, to coin a phrase, excellent? In the
jargon of the practicing bar, all plaintiff has to do is "get past the court"
and he is home. That is what the minority opinion invites.
The whole philosophical thrust of the Court's recent decisions
seems to support the minority view. There has been an unmistakable
trend towards giving an injured plaintiff a recovery if at all possible.
Surely that accounts in great measure for the development of the "strict
liability" doctrine. Surely it accounts in great measure for the initial
substantive stretches of "warranty" to protect those hitherto excluded
by the "privity" concept.0
And perhaps nowhere more dramatically is this philosophy apparent than in the burgeoning choice-of-law realm in tort. There the major
developments, beginning with Babcock v. Jackson7 and culminating
with Tooker v. Lopez8 in 1969 and involving (in Tooker) the overruling of Dym v. Gordon,9 were almost entirely plaintiff-oriented and
can be much more readily explained under a "plaintiff's viewpoint"
approach (which the Court has not formally adopted) rather than the
"grouping of contracts" or "interest analysis" approaches (which the
judges continue to employ as the formal labels).
If the thread tying together the substantive developments is de5 Id. at 351, 253 N.E.2d at 214, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 499 (dissenting opinion).
6 See, e.g., GoIdberg v. Kollsman Instr. Co., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d
592 (1963); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399,
226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962).
7 12 N.Y.2d 437, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
8 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
9 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.YS.2d 463 (1965).
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signed to ease the injured plaintiff's path to recovery, one can readily
argue that the motivations behind these substantive developments
should not be undone by inconsistent postures taken on attendant
procedural problems.
In some recent instances the Court has bent over backwards to
supply an injured New Yorker with a New York forum, "construing"
procedural provisions mercilessly to reach that result.' 0 Underlying such
a move is unquestionably a motive to ease the plaintiff's path. Is it consistent to squeeze one set of procedural provisions" to get jurisdiction
for the plaintiff, and then use another 12 to preclude his recovery? These
two areas are not as unrelated as may seem at first blush. This writer
has watched developments in the Court of Appeals closely during the
past decade. A prevalent motive in personal injury cases has been to
help the plaintiff. Whatever this may be born of - it is apparently the
assumption that it is an insurer and thereby the national pool of insurance premiums which will supply the recovery fund -it
is unmistakable in a host of opinions. It seems to me that a case like Mendel
is a departure from the Court's own chartered path and a destruction
rather than implementation of its broad underlying aim. Another
example of such a departure (and destruction) appears in Schwartz
v. Public Administrator,13 involving a collateral estoppel problem. The
Court in Schwartz held that driver #1 was precluded by collateral
estoppel from recovering for his injuries against driver #2 because in a
prior action a passenger had recovered against both drivers. The realities of the Court's substantive aims are set forth well in Judge Bergan's
dissenting opinion in that case, where the judge reasonably asks why
the Court, whose policies in personal injury litigation are clear enough
in numerous cases, should suddenly turn, in the context of a procedural
problem, to a course of action wholly at war with that policy.14 It was
apparently Judge Bergan's view in Schwartz that the Court was so engaged in surgery on a single tree that it lost sight of the forest it was so
carefully planting.
That seems to be what was lost sight of in Mendel.
Indeed, there is a rather plain irony in all of this, in which
Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp.15 figures strongly.
Blessington at first seems consistent with the Mendel majority view,
10 See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 812, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).

11 CPLR 820(c), 5201(a). See also Commentaries to CPLR 5201, New York Consolidated
Laws (McKinney 1969).
§ 2-725; CPLR 213.
1' 24 N.Y.2d 65, 246 N.E2d 725, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1969).
14 Id. at 76, 246 N.E.2d at 732, 298 N.YS.2d at 964.
15 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
12 UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE
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which cites and relies on it. In Blessington the Court held that the
warranty period applied and ran from the sale. But in Blessington that
had the effect of preserving plaintiff's claim, which would have been
barred under a three-year-from-injury standard.
But while the rule of Blessington is consistent, its result, which sustained the plaintiff's suit, is not. And one cannot help but conjecture
that if a vice-versa holding had been necessary to sustain the plaintiff's
action in Blessington, i.e., where the claim would have been alive under
a three-year-from-injury measure though dead under a six-year-from-sale
measure, Blessington would have sustained that, too, and Mendel would
itself- if Blessington really dictates its result - have gone the other
way. This is not cynicism. It is merely an acknowledgement of what
can and necessarily does occur in a common-law system. The judges
are confronted with a novel situation and the rule they devise to govern
it-it
being up to them to formulate the rule - implements some
broad policy the judges discern as being required by the times. In that
light, which only illuminates the legitimate function of judges in a
common-law society, we may say that Blessington was right. By that
same light, we would have to say that Mendel is probably wrong. If
Blessington is to be held to account, and Mendel relieved of fault under
stare decisis, we could say that Blessington was too limited in its approach.., too anxious to pronounce a rule that would protect that
particular plaintiff's claim and stop there. Perhaps Blessington should
have included some statement to the effect that measuring the period
from the sale is but an alternative open to the plaintiff to be linked up
only with the warranty claim, but that the holding does not preclude
the use of tort's accrual-from-injury rule for such theory as "strict
liability" even though the proof sustaining the latter theory is largely
the same as that which sustains warranty - the major factor being that
both cast out the need to prove negligence.
These conclusions, however, are the product of hindsight. They
are the rearward vision made possible only by the intervening further
development of the strict liability theory. There is no need to fault
Blessington. It did what had to be done to carry forth the pro-plaintiff
policy of the courts in personal injury cases. It at least implemented
the policy whose motivating presence (if we are correct in deducing
that such a policy exists) should be omnipresent behind the scenes. It
is Mendel's restrictive reading of Blessington, as Judge Breitel indicates
in his dissent, which undermines the policy.
The dissent had available to it an additional point. It did not make
it; it is only slightly tangential:
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CPLR 5001 and its history allows interest on every cause of action
from the time of its accrual with but two exceptions. One is the personal injury claim (the other, which does not concern us here, is
punitive damages). But this exception developed during the era when
personal injury was predicated almost exclusively on negligence. As
warranty began to make inroads, and personal injury recoveries were
based in ever increasing numbers on warranty instead of negligence, the
question naturally arose whether such recovery when based on a warranty
theory would draw interest. P is injured by a defective product in 1964.
He sues in 1968 and wins on a warranty claim. His verdict is $50,000.
If the predicate were negligence, he would get no interest from accrual
to verdict. But he prevailed on warranty. Does he get the interest? It
8
amounts to some $12,000 at a 6 percent rate." The Court of Appeals
itself realized the absurdity of allowing so much extra money merely
because the underlying claim was based on a warranty breach rather
than negligence and held in Gillespie v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co.17 that the interest was unavailable regardless of the underlying
theory of liability.
Gillespie in effect recognizes that for so substantial a purpose as
interest, the personal injury is still a tort though predicated on warranty. For so substantial a purpose as the statute of limitations, then,
should it not be similarly treated, at least as an alternative? The theoretical justification for such a treatment, which would enable the
warranty theory to survive as well (with its period of limitations and
starting time), is as the dissent in Mendel suggests: Treat the warranty
not as an exclusive remedy, but rather as an alternative one, with strict
liability also kept on the scene to offer plaintiff a time-of-injury accrual
if that would help him.' 8
If the seller of the item thereby ends up with a prolonged liability,
which is what the Mendel majority principally feared, the justification,
emanating from the holdings of the Court of Appeals for a long time
now, is that as between the item's seller and the injured plaintiff the
latter should be favored if the law makes it reasonably possible. As the
Mendel dissent indicates, the law does make it reasonably possible. With
the advent of the warranty and strict liability theories the Court has
16 Apparently, the rate is even higher today. See Commentaries to CPLR 5004, New
York Consolidated Laws (McKinney 1969).
17 21 N.Y.2d 823, 235 N.E.2d 911, 288 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1968).
18 25 N.Y.2d at 346, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 495. For purposes of "long-arm"
jurisdiction, we may also note that the "tortious act" of CPLR 302(a)(2) and (3) has been
construed to embrace a breach of warranty as well. See, e.g., Naples v. City of New York,
34 App. Div. 2d 577, 309 N.Y.S.2d 663 (2d Dep't 1970).
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made plain that it wants to relieve the plaintiff of proof of negligence,
if feasible. With Mendel, the majority, through the collateral factor of
the statute of limitations, reimposes that burden on the plaintiff, though
it was quite feasible not to.
Impleader Problems
The Mendel decision is setting up some rules which are bound to
have impact, and likely an unfortunate one, in impleader situations.
In the Mendel case, the only sale involved was by the glass company to the bank. The period of limitations on plaintiff's claim against
the company was measured from the time the company sold the glass
to the bank. Mendel thus seems to stand for the proposition that in a
suit by an injured person against the seller of an item, the period of
limitations (four years under the UCC 19) runs from the time of that
particular defendant's sale of the item. How will that figure when two
sales are involved, one by manufacturer to retailer and the other by
retailer to consumer?
In October 1964, let us assume M (manufacturer) sells a truckload
of pressure cookers to R (retailer). R puts them on his shelves and sells
many. Now, in 1969, a few of that old shipment are still in R's stock
and P wants one. He buys it from R in October of 1969. It explodes
and injures P in 1970. P sues M for breach of warranty. The period
(under Mendel) is the four years of UCC 2-725, running from the time
of tender of delivery -loosely speaking, from the "sale." Which sale?
The sale from M to R in 1964 or from R to P in 1969? If the former, P
is too late under the statute of limitations. If the latter, he is in time.
Though Mendel involved only one sale, it seems to stand for the proposition that when a defendant is sued in warranty the period of limitations against him is measured from the time he sold the item, which
would be 1964 in our example. P is too late.
Now turn to the impleader point.
Suppose that P sues only R, the retailer. As against R, P's warranty
claim accrued in 1969 (when R sold the item to P) and is timely. Now
R seeks to implead M to make M hold R harmless for what P may
recover from R. M moves to dismiss on the ground that M was impleaded in 1970, more than four years after M's sale to R. Is the irapleader barred? Lower court cases indicate that it is,20 and on assumptions which Mendel now apparently supports. Here, then, is the greatest
19 UNFoi COmmRCIAL CoDE § 2-725.
20 See, e.g., C.K.S., Inc. v. Helen Borgenicht Sportswear, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 650, 253
N.YS.2d 56 (Ist Dep't 1964).
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injustice Mendel has in store. R, an innocent retailer selling a packaged
item in whose manufacture he had no part but for which he bears a
"warranty" liability under the law, is precluded under the statute of
limitations from recovering over against the one (Al) who (if anyone is)
21
is really at fault.
Is that what Mendel seeks in that context? There is an out, of
course, when that situation arises. All the Court has to do to enable
R to recover over against M is denominate the claim-over as one in
"indemnity." That would accomplish two things. It would append a
six-year period to the claim-over 22 and would start it running from the
time R actually pays P's judgment. The law has in fact done that in
negligence cases when the original defendant was only "passively"
negligent. He is permitted to implead the one "actively" negligent
without fear that the period of limitations has run. In fact, his claimover has not even "accrued" yet, and will not accrue until judgment in
the main action is secured by the plaintiff and paid by the defendant.
A similar result can be reached in warranty cases. It would entail only
this: that the court permit the claim-over to qualify in all regards as
an "indemnity" claim (with the concomitant advantages of the statute
of limitations).
Will Mendel permit that? One can only wait and see. It sounds
fair as set forth above, but it also has its potential injustices. If R keeps
M's items on the shelf indefinitely, M can be held to account for
breaches of warranty many, many years after M's original sale to R.
What the Court of Appeals does have in any event to do is decide
for itself just what its broad purposes are in this personal injury area
and then go about the business of seeing to it that arguable procedural
or other collateral matters not be permitted to obscure the aim. If the
policy of the Court has been to ease the path of the personal injury
plaintiff and the present roster of the Court are behind that policy, one
would have to conclude that the Mendel case is not a very faithful
servant.
21 See Note, An Appraisal of Judicial Reluctance to Imply an Indemnity Contract in
Time-Barred Breach of Warranty Suits, 39 ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 361 (1965).
22 CPLR 213(2).

